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illustrates how the war on terrorism places increasingly complex demands on lawyers advising warfighters at the tactical, operational, and especially at the strategic level. The variety and import of legal issues at the strategic level are continuingly increasing and it is time to examine how the spectrum of legal advice and advocacy required at the strategic level ("strategic lawyering") must change to more effectively support the war on terrorism. While strategic lawyering would not have saved Mr. Couso, strategic lawyering is vital when incidents like the death of Mr. Couso occur.
Strategic lawyering requires both proactive and responsive legal advice and support in "lawfare" --the use of law as a weapon of war. Many strategists suggest that winning the war on terrorism will require winning a war of ideology including the use of effective international collective action. Lawyers , who receive specialized schooling and training with emphasis on effective analysis, reasoning, advice, and advocacy, must play a direct and indirect role in winning this war of ideology. This study analyze s the capabilities of military legal advisors at the strategic level to support the war on terrorism using their specialized legal training, education, and experience and considers how commanders at the strategic and operational level may use this support best. The study reviews examples of strategic issues in which military lawyers could have played a larger role and contributed to better issue resolution and argues that the military should employ legal support more aggressively when addressing strategic-level concerns. Finally, recommendations are offered for reducing the gap between current Army legal advisors' roles and those which this study considers desirable.
The Strategic Level of War and Strategy
Three levels of war are described in current Army doctrine: strategic, operational, and tactical. These categories are to be used as doctrinal perspectives to clarify the relationships between strategic objectives and tactical actions. 14 The strategic level is "that level at which a nation . . . determines national and multinational security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish them." 15 Strategy recently has been defined as: "the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy." 16 This definition is similar to the model espoused at the U.S. Army War College, which analogizes strategy as a three-legged stool balancing ends, ways, and means. 17 Use of the military instrument of power to achieve the U.S. National Security Strategy is addressed in the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. 18 The transformation of national level strategy and policy into theater strategy occurs at the strategic level of war. 19 Combatant commanders are central in the process of translating strategic direction into operational plans and execution. 20 The planning and execution of campaigns is the transition point between the strategic and operational level of war. Current Army doctrine establishes that legal support to operations falls into three functional areas: command and control, sustainment, and personnel service support. The practice of operational law involves providing those legal services that directly affect the sustainment and command and control of an operation. 23 There are six core legal disciplines:
administrative law, civil law (including contract, fiscal and environmental law), claims, international law, legal assistance, and military justice. 24 By doctrine, Army judge advocates have three fundamental objectives: supporting the mission (protecting and promoting command authority); providing service (meeting the legal needs -generally personal needs -of commanders, staffs, personnel, and family members); and enhancing legitimacy (engendering public respect and support for military operations, through, among other things, promoting justice and ethical behavior). 25 Doctrine recognizes that judge advocates in the 21st Century will be challenged in accomplishing their objectives. In particular, to accomplish missions Army judge advocates must thoroughly understand the military mission to better forestall and resolve legal issues affecting the mission and "must become more involved in the military decision-making process in critical planning cells, and at lower levels of command." 26 In accomplishing their objective of enhancing legitimacy, judge advocates will have to transmit their thorough understanding of U.S. values and Constitutional and international law to assist commanders in integrating these laws and values into military operations.
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Current Army doctrine does an excellent job of articulating legal support at the tactical and operational levels of war, describing legal disciplines and providing an overview of Army judge advocate roles, functions, and challenges. Current Army doctrine, however, fails to adequately address how Army judge advocates specifically, and military legal advisors to senior strategic leaders generally, should operate at the strategic level in the current legally-intensive security environment, including the ongoing war on terrorism. 28 Current doctrine does not adequately address the uses of the Army lawyer's trained and ready mind when providing candid advice referring not only to the law but also to "moral, economic, social, and political factors." 29 Finally, doctrine does not make the most use of the fact that military lawyers often operate across all levels of war at the same time, and interact with and provide advice to all elements of a command and staff -working both laterally and horizontally within the organization -and, thus, are well-placed to think globally about issues that affect the organization.
Increase in Legal Issues
It is apparent after any cursory review of national news that legal issues related to military operations are increasing. Within the last few months, the popular media have exhaustively discussed and dissected issues as disparate as prosecution of military personnel for abuses at Abu Ghraib, legal status of detainees, the legal status of terrorists, the legality of pre-emptive war, and prosecution of alleged war crimes perpetrators before the International Criminal Court.
Part of the increasing pace of legal issues affecting the military can be attributed to the steady increase of substantive international law after World War II, starting with the founding of the United Nations (UN) and issuance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, through the numerous arms control and human rights treaties and conventions more recently. 30 Increasingly demanding international law constraints and domestic concerns result in the U.S. military being subject to high expectations and significant regulatory guidance. 31 Globalization -the everincreasing interdependent nature of life throughout the globe -also naturally increases the amount and impact of law internationally because of the need for effective regulation of commerce and information flow for commerce to flourish. 32 Also, current U.S. national security strategy is inextricably intertwined with legal issues and lawyering. One of three goals of the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) is "respect for human dignity." 33 In championing human dignity, the U.S. must stand for liberty and justice, the rule of law, and limiting the absolute power of the state. 34 To achieve the goals of the NSS, the U.S. will, among other things, "champion aspirations for human dignity" and "develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power." 35 In developing agendas for cooperative action, consultation and common action are necessary to "sustain the supremacy of . . . common principles."
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The National Defense Strategy (NDS) -the Secretary of Defense's implementation of the NSS -states that the U.S. has "a strong interest in protecting the sovereignty of nation states."
The NDS, however, also says that nations must ". . . exercise their sovereignty responsibly, in conformity with customary principles of international law. . . ." 37 The NDS finds that international partnerships are "a principal source" of the strength of the U.S. and that the U.S. will play a leading role on "issues of common international concern." 38 Of the four strategic objectives of the NDS, two relate to international relations: the U.S. must "strengthen alliances and 56 That is, traditional international relations theory holds that states will balance against concentrations of power. 57 Significant scholarship today argues that because the United States is so strong that this balancing of power must occur not through direct challenges to the United States but rather through use of nonmilitary tools "to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies" using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements. 58 Although the issue of the so-called "soft balancing" is strongly disputed, there appears consensus that weaker states consistently act together, including through the use of international organizations and conventions and for a variety of reasons, to constrain stronger states. 59 As the sole global hegemon, 60 the United States must be concerned with lawfare in this form.
Brigadier General Dunlap's concern that the law is being "hijacked" is echoed by other commentators. One author finds in a recent article: "a rising trend in the frequency and severity of adversary violations of [the law of armed conflict] and humanitarian principles to gain a strategic advantage." 61 Another warns that: ". . . lurking in the back of the minds of commanders is the threat of international condemnation and possible calls for prosecution when errors are made, as they inevitably will be in the confusion of battle." 62 The CFR roundtable expressed a similar concern. 63 Other commentators pose the possibility of a legal "decapitation strike" against the President or military commander -that is, using a personal lawsuit to harass and distract the leader. 64 Ultimately, concern about the misuse of the law by our enemies to achieve their objectives has made its way into our strategy documents. The National Defense Strategy notes that a significant strategic vulnerability for the United States is that it will be challenged by those who use international fora and judicial processes to further their ends. 65 Other commentators dispute that lawfare is a risk to military operations. They argue that conducting military operations in a manner fully consistent with international law and the LOAC does not constrain the military and actually helps the United States win its conflicts. This line of analysis dismisses concerns about constraints on U.S. military force imposed through international law, sovereignty-constraining treaties, or "soft balancing," and, more importantly, maintains that concerns about lawfare have eroded the United States' respect for the international law with negative consequences in the war against terrorism. 66 Because America is a democracy founded under the rule of law (the Constitution, et. al) it is asserted that America must act in accordance with law, even when confronted with serious threats, or risk losing its foundation in values. 67 Additionally, as America often functions in, or desires to function in, a military coalition, it is pointed out that America cannot afford to be viewed by the international community as completely disregarding international law and the LOAC.
Fundamentally, lawfare in its broadest meaning represents both risk and opportunity for the United States military. Substantive international law is becoming increasingly more complex. Application of the LOAC, particularly given the increasing accuracy of many weapons in the United States' inventory and the urban nature of counter-insurgency warfare, is becoming ever more nuanced. These increasing challenges give opportunities to our opponents to challenge and obstruct in legal fora and the "court of world opinion." In today's complex, interrelated, and well-publicized environment, law has inexorably become a tool of war. Like all tools of war, the use of law in war is neither inherently right nor wrong. It is how the law is used that defines its nature.
Thus, military attorneys cannot cede to the enemy the use of law as a weapon of war.
They must embrace the concept of lawfare, recognizing that the use of law as a weapon of war is a permanent part of military operations. In today's environment, lawfare encompasses the actions that U.S. military attorneys take, and advise their clients to take, to maintain legitimacy, ensure the greatest freedom of action, consistent with domestic and international law, and fight and win the Nation's wars.
Strategic Lawyering and Proactive Defensive Lawfare
Lawyers at the strategic level, at a minimum, must be able to recognize lawfare when it occurs and react appropriately. Optimally, military lawyers should address lawfare that may damage U.S. defense interests before the damage occurs. That is, in general, legal issues are decided by application of the law to the particular facts in question. Proactive lawfare, therefore, is working in advance of issues arising to shape the law and facts in such a way that our clients'
interests will be supported when the issues do arise.
In addressing defensive lawfare, one first must realize that non-enemies can successfully execute lawfare resulting in strategic impacts on the U.S. For example, some assert that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has employed lawfare against the U.S. -working through legal fora to constrain U.S. power. 68 The first step in addressing lawfare by non-enemies is knowledge about their efforts. That is, the strategic level attorney must maintain familiarity with the arguments and efforts that are being made in international fora that can have a negative impact on United States security and military operations. By tracking these efforts, the strategic-level attorney can either deploy resources under his or her control, or more likely, interface with higher headquarters attorneys or attorneys at other U.S. Government agencies and assist those attorneys in working to shape the future.
Along with knowledge -that is, "spotting the issue" -the DoD must devote sufficient personnel and resources to adequately address the concern. That is, is the DoD devoting sufficient resources to advocating U.S. interests before the various international organizations that consider issues that may result in legal limitations and have negative impacts to U.S.
security and military operations? Active participation has the benefit of defending the U.S. from unmanageable restrictions as U.S. participation helps shape the nature of the discussion and resolution of issues. Additionally, active participation demonstrates the U.S. is taking a leadership role in the international community and supports the national security strategies' objectives of engagement and use of coalitions.
An example of a proactive lawfare in the area of international convention and treaties would be the U.S. initiating a review of and suggesting changes to current international treaties and conventions concerning status of combatants who do not comply with the LOAC.
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Working towards, and ultimately obtaining, international consensus on this contentious issue would demonstrate U.S. respect for international law and would be a proactive measure to improve U.S. stature in the international community. It would be a means of "taking the fight" to the international community that endlessly criticizes the U.S. policy regarding unlawful combatants. 70 Successful resolution of this issue would also benefit the U.S. military by ensuring the continuance of the absolute status protection currently granted under the LOAC to military personnel operating in conformity with the LOAC requirements. 71 Proactive lawfare, of course, requires a careful weighing of risks and benefits. Thus, proactively seeking international consensus on the status of unlawful combatants has its risks which must be weighed against the potential gains. The point for strategic level lawyers, however, is that they should aggressively seek possible proactive actions and actively assess the risks of such proactive actions. Merely that risk exists should not be sufficient to nullify action. If the potential benefits outweigh the risks then, in coordination with other pertinent actors and upon decision by commanders or other senior officials when appropriate, action should then be taken to pursue the proactive opportunity.
A more commonly accepted concept is that enemies use lawfare to constrain U.S. Brigadier General Dunlap observed in his seminal article that when an enemy during armed conflict employs lawfare the enemy generally is aiming to diminish the strength of U.S. and coalition allies' will and support for the military effort. 72 Actual violations of the LOAC may not be necessary to have a detrimental effect -perceived violations if not successfully contested can have just as deleterious effects on U.S. and allied will to fight.
In addressing adversary-initiated lawfare, the strategic-level attorney must work aggressively to ensure that the correct legal analysis is deployed in the public domain. A predicate to successfully defending against this form of lawfare is ensuring that the command has an accurate understanding of the facts and has adequately documented them. Without a good understanding and documentation to back up that understanding, any lie can be made believable and good faith misunderstandings are much more likely. Assuming the command has a good grasp of the facts, the next step is ensuring effective communication of the facts and applicable law to the public and other interested parties. Ultimately, where groups "challenge a prudent command decision that involves civilians, well-prepared, thorough, fact-based arguments should be made aggressively and swiftly to defend command action, to maintain the initiative, and prevent operational degradation." 73 This requires not only well-trained military attorneys, but well-trained public affairs officers, command spokespersons, and information operations officers. Strategic-level attorneys must ensure that these personnel are educated in the LOAC and application of the LOAC to the situation at issue so that precise, accurate, and pertinent information is provided. To defeat lawfare of this type, however, military attorneys also must convince command spokespersons that an aggressive public education campaign about what the LOAC requires is necessary. 74 Ultimately, military attorneys also may have to shed their normal reticence and be willing to engage the media themselves on behalf of their command.
The War on Terrorism, the War of Ideologies, and the Strategic Legal Advisor: Using Lawfare to our Advantage?
Our national strategies recognize that the war on terror is a war of ideas. 75 It is a clash of U.S. values being spread through globalization against the reactionary beliefs of radical
Islamists who desire to replace this system with a radical Islamist world order. Such is inevitable given that the U.S. is a values-based country with a values-based government. 76 The NSS states that with America's current unprecedented strength and influence come unparalleled responsibilities and opportunities. 77 As the NSS states, U.S. strategic precepts are based on an American internationalism reflecting U.S. values combined with U.S. national interests in a globe that is increasingly united by common values and interests. That the war on terrorism is a war of ideas is frequently written about. 78 80 Since the U.S. possesses such great military and economic power, the U.S. is at a disadvantage in the war of ideas because its power is threatening. Fundamentally, to someone outside the U.S., the scope of the power of the U.S. makes it difficult to determine if the U.S. rhetoric of democracy and freedom is only that -rhetoric. 81 Thus, it can be difficult to determine how the U.S. should undertake to win the war of ideas. While much attention has been paid to the impact of information operations or sometimes called strategic communications, the actual actions of the U.S. also speak volumes. 82 The U.S. decision not to become a party to the Rome Statute runs counter to the National Security Strategy's approach of cooperative action and sustaining common principles. Failure to become a party is inconsistent with the National Defense Strategy's conclusion that international partnerships are "a principal source" of U.S. strength. 95 Additionally, nonmembership is contrary to the NDS objectives of "strengthen[ing] alliances and partnerships,"
and establishing conditions "conducive to a favorable international system." 96 Non-participation results in the U.S. failing to lead a growing international body -failing to exploit a U.S. strength.
Additionally, at face value the U.S. policy runs counter to the NSS goal of respect for human dignity, including championing justice and the rule of law. 97 Finally, non-participation opens the U.S. to international criticism as "unilateralist," hypocritical for decrying war crimes but then acting parochially to protect its nationals, and for engaging in "bullying" diplomacy by pushing for Article 98 agreements to protect U.S. military. 98 As the war on terrorism is a war of ideologies the U.S. must make a significant effort, if not its main effort, in convincing moderate Muslims that Western liberal democratic institutions, ideals, and values provide a better future than radical Islamism. If this is the case, the U.S. must act consistently from a values basis. That is, the U.S. cannot appear to act hypocritically or parochially. Anything that adversely affects perceptions about the U.S. goals in the war on terrorism will weaken U.S. global legitimacy, and, therefore, adversely affects the ability of the U.S. to successfully prosecute the war on terrorism. 99 In short, not being a party to the Rome Statute is a strategic mistake in the war on terrorism.
The NSS and the NDS explicitly and implicitly state that the U.S. has the right to act outside of a coalition or international organization to defend against a sufficient threat to U.S.
national security. 100 The authority and necessity to use preemptive or preventive war to defend the U.S. does not negate the inconsistency between the national strategies and the current U.S.
policy towards the ICC. Although the NSS and NDS display a willingness to "go it alone" they clearly and repetitively articulate that "going with others" is the preferred course. Additionally, the NDS identifies that the U.S. will be challenged by the use of "international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism." 101 This statement recognizes the reality of terrorist tactics. If anything, if terrorists are using "judicial processes" and "international fora" against the U.S., the U.S. ought to not absent itself from this part of the theater strategic environment of the war on terrorism. 102 As long as the U.S. is not a party to the ICC, it will have great difficulty in influencing ICC rules, policies, or application.
Thus, in light of national strategy and best practices in prosecuting the war on terror, the U.S. should consider revoking its non-party notification and becoming a party to the Rome For most lawyers, legal education begins in law school. Despite what many non-lawyers think, legal education does not teach students law. This is because "law" is not a finite thing that can be learned. Although law students certainly read cases, statutes, administrative rules, etc., law students soon find that "law is rarely bounded, is often ambiguous, and sometimes practiced in great variance from how it is written." 106 Thus, law students are taught the process by which law is created, why laws are made and how they evolve, values and ethics, research skills, and managing interpersonal relationships, among other things. An effective lawyer must be able to creatively handle novel situations because, in general, no two situations confronting a professional are ever precisely the same. Law schools, therefore, exist to prepare students to be effective practitioners of the legal profession -which requires law schools to teach their students "how to think like a lawyer." 107 Thus, a legal professional not only must be well versed in the field of law, but must be able to exercise appropriate practical judgment while drawing on that knowledge in succeeding unique circumstances. 108 Among the many characteristics required of good lawyers, good practical judgment is the "key faculty needed when lawyers seek to identify, assess, and propose concrete solutions in particular and often complex social circumstances." 109 Legal education contributes to developing practical judgment in a variety of ways, for example, through the casebook methodology of teaching the law 110 and the use of the Socratic teaching method. 111 Practical judgment is a combination of sound deliberation --including exercising the intellect and considering moral values --and prudent decision leading to action. 112 Thus, good lawyers are able to see the whole situation, the forest and the trees at the same time, so to speak, taking into account opposing and varied perspectives simultaneously, and being able to articulate likely viewpoints and concerns of multiple participants in a process. 113 Judgment, for lawyers, means to "invoke and apply knowledge responsively when there are competing concerns and discrete decisions" that need to be made. 114 Once a student leaves law school and becomes an attorney, the requirement to apply judgment while drawing on the knowledge of the law only increases. One could argue that for senior military attorneys the exercise of practical judgment within a legal context is their primary activity. The ever-present need for lawyers to apply practical judgment is so widely understood within the legal profession that the legal rules of ethics formally endorse lawyers contemplating nonlegal considerations on behalf of their clients. and quality of justice. 117 Legal scholars generally agree that non-legal counseling should be encouraged -it is not only permissible, but desirable in certain circumstances. 118 Additionally, as a practical matter given the growing complexity of life, lawyers are increasingly required to provide advice on issues that would not be considered legal by traditional standards. An example of how lawyers' excellence in practical judgment can be used to further sound decision-making and adherence to American values occurs in Irving Janis' studies into the group decision-making failure he termed "groupthink." Janis introduced the concept of groupthink in his 1972 article titled "Groupthink: the Desperate Drive for Consensus at Any
Cost." 121 In this article Janis argued that significant policy decisions that were fiascos were the result of a group dynamic that he called "groupthink." In particular, Janis used as his example the decision by President Kennedy to authorize the Bay of Pigs operation, noting that the lack of intelligence of the decision-maker and his advisors was not the cause for this notably bad decision. 122 Janis noted that one of the "key characteristics of groupthink" is that members of the group remain loyal to the group by sticking to the policies to which the group has already committed itself. 123 Groupthink arises among groups in which the members avoid being too harsh in their judgments of their leaders' or colleagues' ideas -the members adopt a "soft line" of criticism. 124 Thus, although pressure from within the group to conform to the group's consensus is not unknown, self-censorship of thought is more prevalent. In groupthink, when addressing personal, lingering uncertainties the members tend to give the benefit of the doubt to the group consensus. Groupthink tends to increase, he stated, as group cohesiveness increases because: "[i]n a cohesive group, the danger is not so much that each individual will fail to reveal his objections to what the others propose but that he will think the proposal is a good one, without attempting to carry out a careful, critical scrutiny of the pros and cons of the alternatives ." 125 Group members participating in a group of respected colleagues, Janis analyzed, can fall into consensual validation of beliefs, vice individual, personal critical thinking.
Thus, in a remarkably counter-intuitive manner, high group cohesion can work against a group and be a negative factor to making good decisions. Groupthink occurs, Janis stated, as a "mutual effort among the group members to maintain self-esteem and emotional equanimity by providing social support to each other" especially at times of decision-making under stress.
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Since his initial article was published, the concept of groupthink has grown in popularity, becoming a "standard item in textbooks in social psychology, organization and management, and public policy-making." 127 Janis prescribed remedies for the groupthink trap. Groups "whose members have properly defined roles, with traditions concerning the procedures to follow in pursuing a critical inquiry" probably make better decisions than any lone decision-maker. 128 Thus, policy leaders should stress that each member of a policy-forming group should act as a "critical evaluator"; experts and evaluation groups outside the policy-making group should work on the same policy issues and challenge views of the core group; all members should be encouraged to air any residual doubts; and, finally, whenever an evaluation of policy alternatives is required, "at least one member should play devil's advocate , functioning as a good lawyer in challenging . . . those who advocate the majority opinion." 129 Senior military lawyers, through education, training and experience, are an excellent choice to mitigate groupthink during decision-making at the strategic level --acting as Janis' "devil's advocate" and as a "good lawyer" to challenge the majority position. 130 Lawyers' lack of specific information relevant to the group's decision under review does not detract from their capability to perform this role. Groups are frequently formed from those who know about the problem and the group members are expected to bring problem-specific expertise, information, and analysis to the group's problem-solving process. Groupthink can be mitigated, however, by the participation of members from outside the group or by having a participant responsible for challenging the majority position. A lawyer with little or no knowledge of the specific issue under discussion, because of training and experience can fulfill the role of majority challenger. A senior military attorney is educated and trained to ask the right questions, rapidly assess and assimilate facts, consider their import, and articulate positions, with the expectation that nonlegal concerns will be integrated into the analysis.
Pulling it all Together -the Role of Strategic Legal Advisor
It is a given that senior military attorneys operating at the strategic level will understand the legal implications and will provide the advice necessary to avoid violations of the law. It must be recognized, however, that at the strategic level often the law is at its most flexible -that is, the law is most malleable. In short, at the strategic level there is the greatest capability to shape the law to meet the commander's needs. For example, the senior attorneys' direct clients may be the writers of the regulations under interpretation. Modification of the regulation is a very real possibility, as versus a remote and time-consuming possibility to an attorney in the field. Similarly, access to the Congressional legislative cycle is significantly greater at the strategic level and attempting to change a troublesome statute is always an option that should be considered. Finally, "precedential" interpretations or policies that drive field attorneys'
opinions are published at the strategic level. Thus, an attorney at the strategic level must always consider how the law can be shaped or how interpretations can be changed as a possible answer to an issue with legal concerns.
In making the analysis of how the law can be shaped, the attorney must be encouraged to consider the effect and provide advice on the strategic and policy implications of the Additionally, the military legal establishment, both at DoD and Service levels, should consider establishing a joint legal office at the national level responsible for analyzing legal trends and issues, making recommendations to senior legal personnel responsible for advising strategic leaders, and working to keep the larger legal community informed of these trends and the ongoing analysis. This organization would be chartered to recognize legal threats and propose responses -with a constant view towards their impact on strategic operations. 15 Ibid. 16 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17. This definition is comparable to that of the famous military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, who defined strategy as "the use of engagements for the object of the war." I note that Clausewitz wrote at a time when war was intensely personal, when commanders could -for perhaps the last timesee all the troops under their command during battle, when effective weapon ranges were less than what a car can drive on the highway in one minute, and when operational plans were constrained by the distance man and animal carrying a load could march in one day. Clausewitz could not envision the destructiveness of today's weapons; the ability of twenty men to kill over 3,000 civilians in a few minutes time, the shrinking of time and space, and the increasingly phenomenal ability to communicate across distance and to multiple persons. Nonetheless, he wrote about war in a way that is still relevant. He provides insights that are still worth considering. I agree with Gray that Clausewitz is unique among military theorists because of the breadth, quality, and quantity of his insights. 24 Ibid., viii. In general, some elements of all the core legal disciplines are present in each of the legal functional areas. 25 Ibid., 1-1. 26 Ibid., 1-8. 27 Ibid. 28 For purposes of this article, the "war on terrorism" is used to describe all military operations aimed at defeating terrorist groups -those who employ the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear with the intent to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. See 38 Ibid., 4-5. 39 Ibid., 6-7. 40 Ibid., iv. 41 Ibid., 1. 42 Ibid., 4-5, 7. 43 Ibid., 18-19. ("Many of the current legal arrangements that govern overseas posture date from an earlier era. Today, challenges are more diverse and complex, our prospective contingencies are more widely dispersed, and our international partners are more numerous. International agreements relevant to our posture must reflect these circumstances and support greater operational flexibility. They must help, not hinder, the rapid deployment and employment of U.S. and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis. Consistent with our partners' sovereign considerations, we will seek new legal arrangements that maximize our freedom to: deploy our forces as needed; conduct essential training with partners in the host nation; and, support deployed forces around the world. Finally, legal arrangements should encourage responsibility-sharing between us and our partners, and provide legal protections for our personnel through Status of Forces Agreements and protections against transfers of U.S. personnel to the International Criminal Court.") 44 48 Specific examples would include using civilians as involuntary or voluntary "human shields" of legitimate military targets and placing military assets in otherwise noncombatant facilities (e.g. churches, hospitals). Dunlap, 13. 49 Ibid., 13-14. The RTS was the state-run media station in central Belgrade and was used as a tool for propaganda dissemination. The airstrike resulted in the death of 16 people and injuring of 16 more. Human Rights Watch criticized the strike as violative of the Law of Armed Conflict because the strike did not directly contribute to the military operation and because the risks to noncombatants greatly outweighed any military benefit. The ICTY accepted NATO's defense of the airstrike based on RTS broadcast of military communications, but observed in its
